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Abstract 
This study examines the change of China’s Third World policy 
from the Maoist era to the present. The term “Third World” refers 
to all developing and underdeveloped countries in Central Asia, 
South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. During the 
Maoist and the Dengist era, China was mainly responding to the 
international pressures from the United States and the Soviet Union 
rather than dealing with the Third World countries per se. But since 
the launching of the War on Terror in 2001, the American military 
expansion into Iraq and Afghanistan completely changed China’s 
diplomatic priorities. Beijing has begun to pursue an active policy 
of engaging many Third World countries in order to undermine the 
U.S.-dominated international order. This development reflects the 
current Chinese government’s rhetoric about the peaceful rise of 
China, meaning that a powerful China will not threaten its Asian 
neighbors as the Western imperialists had done in the past. 
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China’s Third World Policy  
from the Maoist Era to the Present* 
 
Joseph Tse-Hei Lee 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
From Darfur to Burma, many years of civil war have caused 
hundreds of thousands of deaths and numerous internally displaced 
people in the cities and countryside. The international communities 
have used the strongest language possible to condemn the 
bloodshed in both countries and held the Sudanese and Burmese 
governments accountable for crimes against civilians. Because China 
is the largest business partner and military supplier to both countries, 
the West, especially the United States, have pressurized Beijing to 
support the deployment of the United Nations peacekeeping forces 
to Darfur and to impose sanctions against Burma. Even though 
Beijing did not act as what the United States called a “responsible 
international player” by interfering into the Sudanese and Burmese 
internal affairs, the world have yet to come to grips with China as a 
                                                 
* I thank Pace University in New York for the support of this project through a 
Summer Research Grant, a Scholarly Research Award and a Presidential Grant 
on Internationalization in 2006. I also thank Liselotte Odgaard, Frans-Paul van 
der Putten, Siu-Keung Cheung, Harry Cliadakis and Christie Chui-Shan Chow 
for comments and suggestions. 
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great power in the early twentieth-first century.  
 
China now has no formal power or infrastructure to be a First 
World state, but it possesses the practical ability, adequate resources 
and clear political will to become a champion of the Third World. At 
the Beijing Summit and the Third Ministerial Conference of the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in November 2006, President 
Hu Jintao pledged to open up its market for more than four hundred 
types of tariff-free import items from those developing African 
countries with diplomatic ties with Beijing. 1  As with his 
predecessors, President Hu views the Third World in both 
ideological and geopolitical terms. He is pursuing a larger strategy 
of creating a multipolar and anti-hegemonic world order, but at the 
same time, he is determined to combine that cause with China’s goal 
of competing with the United States in different parts of the world. 
In Hu’s mind, ideological zeal intersects with Realpolitik. 
Meanwhile, the United States is facing a serious military setback in 
the Second Iraqi War and loses the diplomatic battles against North 
Korea and Iran over their nuclear weapon programs. It has become 
increasingly difficult for the Bush administration to hold onto its 
unipolar dominance.2 It is against this new political climate that 
China has begun to use its economic and diplomatic influences to 
counter the United States.  
 
As Wang Yuan-Kang points out, China today is keen to 
maintain a stable international environment for its rapid economic 
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growth and to avoid provoking any vigorous response from the 
United States towards its diplomatic, economic, social and cultural 
expansion.3 Liselotte Odgaard also argues that Beijing is developing 
closer economic relations with many middle powers and weaker 
states as a part of its global strategy to counter the United States in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America.4  After joining the World Trade 
Organization in November 2001, China has been very active in 
making its presence felt in the World Health Organization, the 
Security Council of the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization and the six-nation nuclear talks.  
 
This paper examines the change of China’s Third World policy 
from the Maoist era to the present. The term “Third World” refers to 
all developing and underdeveloped countries in Central Asia, South 
Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. During the Cold 
War, many poorer countries that gained independence from the 
European colonial powers after the Second World War referred to 
themselves as neither being aligned with NATO or the Soviet Union, 
but instead constituting a non-aligned “third world.” Politically, the 
Bandung conference (1955) marked the beginning of the Nonaligned 
Movement in international politics. China and India played an 
important role in launching that conference and in changing the 
relation between the Third World countries, the United States and 
the Soviet Union. This study looks at the Chinese strategies of 
countering the American power in the developing world as well as 
the geopolitical implications of China’s rise in the early twentieth 
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century (Map 1).  
 
 
The Development of China’s Third World Policy 
Let us begin with an analysis of the transformation of China from a 
Soviet ally into a champion of the Third World during the Maoist era 
(1949-1976).5 After the Communist Revolution of 1949, the People’s 
Republic of China was faced with diplomatic isolation imposed by 
the West. Through its strong military presence in South Korea and 
Japan, the United States sought to contain the Maoist China in 
Northeast Asia. The Korean War that began in June 1950 was 
“clearly a war between the United States and China fought on 
Korean soil.”6 It exacerbated tensions between the United States and 
Maoist China, and brought the two countries into open conflict. The 
Sino-American rivalries in the Korean Peninsula marked the 
beginning of the Cold War in Pacific Asia.   
 
The conclusion of a formal alliance between China and the 
Soviet Union in February 1950 was another seminal event in the 
Cold War. From 1950 to 1957, China saw itself as a dependent state 
of the Soviet Union and identified itself within the socialist bloc led 
by Moscow. In return, the Soviet Union sent large numbers of 
Russian technicians assisting China’s industrialization in the early 
1950s. But the Sino-Soviet alliance was short-lived because it was a 
result of hard negotiating, complicated strategic calculations and 
reluctant compromises between Mao and Stalin.7 After Stalin’s death 
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in 1953 and the suppression of the Hungarian Uprising in 1956, 
ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union began to 
surface, although it was as much about Chinese and Soviet national 
interests as it was about Communist ideology. Tensions and rivalries 
led to the Sino-Soviet split in the mid-1960s. Consequently, the 
Soviet Union withdrew its aid program. Then China was aware of 
the lack of support within the socialist world and had to look 
elsewhere for diplomatic recognition. In the meantime, Beijing had 
no seat in the United Nations and the Republic of China in Taiwan 
was recognized by the West as a legitimate authority of China. In 
order to break through diplomatic isolation, Mao was determined to 
build a coalition of radical forces in the Third World against the “U.S. 
imperialism” and the “Soviet revisionism.” Therefore, China 
abandoned its strategic base of support from the socialist camp and 
proceeded to create a new political force made up of the newly 
independent countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. This 
strategy is best characterized in a slogan during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976): “All people of the world unite, to overthrow 
American imperialism, to overthrow Soviet revisionism, to 
overthrow the reactionaries of all nations!”  
 
When Mao turned his attention to the Third World, he 
regarded the Third World as a “land of opportunity” because the old 
political order and alliances were crumbling and the new ones were 
being formed. In that case, China could find many potential allies 
from the Third World. By repositioning China as a Third World 
Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.3 
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country, Mao sought to assert Chinese political leadership and 
achieve a certain degree of global power. In September 1965, 
Marshal Lin Biao said, “The United States and Western Europe are 
cities of the world, whereas Asia, Africa and Latin America are rural 
areas of the world.” In the Chinese Communist rhetoric, it was the 
countryside that encircled the cities and won the Revolution of 1949. 
In other words, Africa, Asia and Latin America were capable of 
forming a united front against the United States and the Soviet 
Union. When China appealed to the Third World during the 1960s 
and 1970s, it supported local nationalistic movements. By invoking 
the anti-colonial rhetoric across Africa, Asia and Latin America, Mao 
presented himself as an international spokesman of the Third World. 
Many Third World intellectuals and African American writers began 
to portray Mao’s China as a model for the developing and 
underdeveloped countries. For instance, W. B. E. Du Bois and his 
wife, Shirley Graham Du Bois, subscribed to the anti-American, 
anti-Soviet and pro-Beijing rhetoric of the day and sympathized 
with “colored Beijing” in its struggle against “white” Moscow. 
During their trip to China in 1959, they were impressed by Mao’s 
support of the anti-colonial movements in Africa and the 
African-American struggle in the United States. They turned Mao 
into an icon and romanticized him as champion of the victims of 
racism and colonialism in their writings.8   
 
Nevertheless, Mao’s Third World policy failed to mobilize the 
developing and underdeveloped countries against the United States 
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and the Soviet Union. Despite their admiration for Mao’s national 
unification and socialist reform, very few Third World countries 
followed China’s international leadership for such a political action 
could run the risk of offending the two superpowers. During the 
Cold War, China was a middle power. It did not have adequate 
military and economic capabilities to underpin its attempt at 
leadership in global politics. It also encountered the military threats 
from the United States and the Soviet Union. The American invasion 
of Vietnam in the mid-1960s threatened China’s southwest frontier 
and led the Chinese to believe that there might be a war with the 
United States in Southeast Asia.9 In 1969, the outbreak of border 
conflicts with the Soviet Union deepened the Chinese sense of 
insecurity. As a result, Mao’s Third World policy failed to create a 
new coalition of states against the American and Soviet influences in 
global politics. China was simply responding to the international 
pressures rather than dealing with the Third World countries per 
se.10 
 
Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform after 1978 marked a radical 
departure from the revolutionary radicalism of the Maoist era. The 
Chinese leadership in Beijing announced in public that China would 
oppose any foreign intervention into another country’s internal 
affairs, but the overall direction of the Chinese foreign policy 
changed. China adopted a pro-Western foreign policy. For instance, 
Beijing gave many financial incentives to the multi-national 
corporations as well as Overseas Chinese and Western investors for 
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establishing joint business ventures. The government was eager to 
join the global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank and the World Trade Organization in order to 
attract foreign investments. Meanwhile, China sent large numbers of 
students to receive technical training from the West rather than 
sending them to work in the Third World. Throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, Beijing even became a strong supporter of the U.S.-dominated 
global order so as to maintain a stable relationship with Washington 
and to maximize the potential economic benefits for its 
modernization. In Deng’s China, the concern for economic reform 
took precedence over the Maoist discourse of the Third World 
liberation. Deng died in early 1997 and his successor, Jiang Zemin, 
continued the same economic reform and pro-Western foreign 
policy. As regards to the Third World countries, China still 
maintained its pragmatic approach to foster diplomatic relations 
with some middle powers such as South Africa, Mexico and Brazil. 
However, the main purpose was not to unify the Third World but to 
marginalize Taiwan in global politics and stop Taiwan from joining 
the World Health Organization, the United Nations and other 
international bodies.  
 
 
A dramatic twist took place after the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001. The War on Terror completely transformed the 
global opinion towards the United States as a superpower. The 
invasion of Iraq provokingly deepened a large-scale anti-American 
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sentiment around the Islamic world. Worse, the complete failures to 
control Afghanistan and Iraq and to stop the nuclear weapons 
program in North Korea and Iran undermined the image of the 
United States as a sole superpower. The subsequent events show 
that the military power of the United States is thinly spread around 
the world. The Bush administration is not capable of fighting several 
regional wars at once and pursuing the policy of global hegemony.11 
Meanwhile, China has repositioned itself to fill the power vacuum 
left by the United States. It has already succeeded in developing 
closer relations with Central Asia and Southeast Asia as well as with 
many oil-producing countries in the Middle East, Latin America and 
Africa.  
 
 
The Silk Road for Oil: The Sino-Russian Alliance in Central Asia 
The new political climate after September 11 ensures China of an 
active role in Central Asia. It is against this background that the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization acquired a new agenda to 
respond to the American military presence in Afghanistan. The 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization was formerly known as the 
“Shanghai Five.” It was initially founded as a regional alliance in 
1996 and consisted of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, and 
Tajikistan. Uzbekistan was invited to join in June 2001 and the 
“Shanghai Five” was officially called the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization.12 Since 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
has become a new regional alliance for multilateral cooperation in 
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political, economic and strategic matters among its members.13 It is 
through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that China projects 
itself as a rising power in Eurasia. The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization has now become a Chinese and Russian led military 
alliance. In 2002, China and Kyrgyzstan carried out the first joint 
military exercise.14 In August 2005, China and Russia launched a 
high-profile military exercise called “Peace Mission 2005” in 
Vladivostok in Russia’s Far East. And some 10,000 troops from the 
armies, navies and air forces of both countries took place in the 
military drill in Shandong province along China’s northeast coast.15 
On August 9-17, 2007, all member states of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization launched a joint anti-terrorism drill 
known as “Peace Mission 2007” in the Urals Mountain City of 
Chelyabinsk in Russia. This joint military exercise coincided with 
President Vladimir Putin’s decision to resume regular bombing 
patrols over the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic oceans.16 Putin’s order 
was a direct response to the relocation of NATO forces closer to 
Russia’s western frontier because NATO has expanded to include 
the Czech Republic, Hungry, Poland as well as the former Soviet 
republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.17 When the United States 
exploited the War on Terror to establish military presence in 
Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Middle East, China and Russia 
combined to form a new regional defense system against the United 
States and to counterbalance Washington’s policies.18 All the joint 
military exercises carried out under the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization have had a direct impact on Northeast Asia. China and 
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Russia have formed a united front with North Korea against the 
U.S.-Japan Security Alliance in the six-nation nuclear talks. Both 
China and Russia are clearly pursuing an ambitious strategy that 
combines the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the six-nation 
nuclear talks to undermine the American influence in Northeast 
Asia. This Sino-Russian partnership is primarily based on the shared 
geopolitical interests between both countries. Therefore, a new 
Sino-Russian strategic alliance is taking shape which involves 
Central Asia and North Korea and could include South Korea in a 
future challenge to the United States.  
 
 
Besides the strategic consideration, the Chinese expansion into 
Central Asia is driven by the needs to reduce its dependence on the 
Middle Eastern oil and to enhance the security of energy supplies for 
its economic reform. In recent decades, China has been totally 
dependent on the Persian Gulf for supplying over 50% of its oil. 
China is now the second largest oil consumer in the world. In 2006, 
the International Energy Agency in the United States estimates that 
the world’s oil demand will increase by 47% from 2003 to 2030, and 
China and India will account for 43% of that increase in world oil 
use.19 This raises a number of strategic problems. First, China only 
began to set up its strategic oil reserve in 2005. The strategic reserve 
is expected to be completed by 2010 to provide China with two 
months’ oil supply at the present level of energy consumption. 
Before 2010, China is still vulnerable to fluctuations in oil price 
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caused by military crises in the Middle East. Second, China does not 
have a strong ocean navy to protect its oil tankers sailing through the 
Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca. China is still dependent on 
the United States to protect these important ocean lanes. But China’s 
pursuit of energy security can be in conflict with the American 
military expansion into the Middle East. 20  The only feasible 
strategies in China’s energy diplomacy are to diversify its energy 
supply and to push for a multipolar power system. In this context, 
the Central Asian oil fields provide an attractive source of energy for 
China. Janet Xuanli Liao refers to the newly established oil and 
natural gas pipelines between China and Central Asia as a “Silk 
Road for oil.”21 In 2004, China and Kazakhstan agreed to build an oil 
pipeline to export oil into the western part of China. In the summer 
of 2005, the China National Petroleum Corporation, a state-owned 
enterprise, took over the Petro-Kazakhstan. China now controls the 
second largest oil company in Kazakhstan through which it can 
expand into other oil projects in that country and further expand 
into the Caspian Sea. As Charles E. Ziegler points out, these 
cooperation projects allow Beijing to promote a new system of 
regional economic integration with its neighbors and to build a 
series of overland oil pipelines from Central Asia and Russia to 
China.22    
China’s rapid expansion into Central Asia has a significant 
impact on the local economy in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous 
Province, a Muslim-dominated region along the old Silk Road. In 
Kashgar, a major city close to the Chinese border with Pakistan, 
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many car-owners and bus drivers have already used natural gas 
rather than petroleum. There were dozens of natural gas stations 
inside the city and along the highways. The natural gas is widely 
used in many Chinese cities along the border with Russia and 
Central Asia. Evidently, there is a strong determination on the 
Chinese part to diversify its energy supply system.   
 
The economic, social and cultural linkages between China and 
Central Asia can also be seen in everyday lives in Xinjiang. Urumqi, 
the provincial capital and Kashgar are always crowded with Russian, 
Central Asian, Persian, Afghani and Pakistani merchants, tourists, 
religious pilgrims, students and government officials. Beijing has 
succeeded in using its Muslim frontier region to reach out to the 
Islamic communities in Eurasia. For instance, the Xinjiang 
Networking Transmission Limited which runs the Urumqi People’s 
Broadcasting Station and the Xinjiang People’s Broadcasting Station, 
and broadcasts in the Mandarin Chinese, Uyghur, Kazak and 
Mongolian languages has begun broadcasting programs in English 
for Pakistan, Afghanistan and all Central Asian states. The purpose 
is to counter the spread of Western ideologies from the Voice of 
America and the B.B.C. and to present China as a land of 
opportunities for many young people in the region.23  Whatever 
China is doing now in relation to Central Asia is based on a 
combination of strategic and economic concerns with the security of 
energy supplies. With this consideration in mind, China is bound to 
expand its connections with Central Asia in the coming years.  
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The Chinese Expansion into Southeast Asia 
In Southeast Asia, China has adopted a very active policy of 
undermining the American economic and diplomatic influences. In 
2005, Beijing encouraged the formation of the East Asian 
Community, a large regional alliance composed of China, Southeast 
Asia, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. Taiwan 
is the only major regional economic power excluded from the East 
Asian Community, but Beijing has offered many tax exemptions for 
Taiwanese agricultural products to be exported to the Mainland. 
With its fast-growing free market economy, the Chinese government 
is eager to use influence to create a win-win situation for all 
neighboring countries. In a fashion akin to the European Economic 
Union, the East Asian Community works towards a regional model 
of economic integration. 24  This development reminds us of the 
intra-Asian trading networks which had dominated the South China 
Sea and the Indian Ocean prior to the arrival of Western 
imperialism.25 All the countries in Southeast Asia had a long history 
of associating with the Middle Kingdom because of the economic 
benefits derived from the Chinese maritime trade. Whether the 
current economic development will lay the foundation for the 
emergence of a China-centered economic union in East Asia and 
whether China’s influence will decline when its economic reform 
slows down and the Chinese market loses its appeal to the 
neighboring countries are debatable. But China has begun to 
challenge the American influence by its attempt to create a new 
economic order in maritime Asia.   
Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.3 
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China and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis 
As the North Korean nuclear crisis evolves, China is playing an 
active role in the six-nation nuclear talks. China has to support 
North Korea because of the strategic necessity to defend its northeast 
frontier against the U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan. China has 
succeeded in reducing the U.S. hostility towards Pyongyang and 
marginalizing the American influence in Northeast Asia. On October 
9, 2006, North Korea conducted their first nuclear test which further 
undermined the American strategic position in Northeast Asia. The 
test proved the capacity of North Korea to produce nuclear weapons. 
The key issue for the United States was no longer how to prevent but 
how to contain a nuclear North Korea.26  On the following day, 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asserted that the United States 
had no intention to invade or attack North Korea, but threatened 
Pyongyang with sanctions if North Korea shared its nuclear 
knowledge with anyone else. Nevertheless, the Bush administration 
still insisted on the multilateral six-nation nuclear talks in order to 
avoid direct negotiation with North Korea. And there were signs of 
disagreement within the Republican Party over whether the Bush 
administration should negotiate directly with Pyongyang. 27  On 
October 14, 2006, the U.N. Security Council adopted unanimously 
the Resolution 1718 which imposed weapons and financial sanctions 
on North Korea over its nuclear test. The Resolution urged all the 
countries concerned “to intensify their diplomatic efforts, to refrain 
from any actions that might aggravate tension and to facilitate the 
early resumption of the Six-Party talks” according to the Joint 
China’s Third World Policy from the Maoist Era to the Present  
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Statement issued on September 19, 2005. 28  The wording of the 
Resolution was very mild. The document opened the door for the 
next several rounds of the six-nation nuclear talks in 2007.   
 
At the same time, China and South Korea decided to continue 
their economic exchanges with North Korea and did not intend to 
strictly enforce the Resolution 1718.29 But when North Korea’s U.N. 
ambassador, Oak Gil-yon, accused the U.N. Security Council as 
“gangster-like” for passing the Resolution and warned that 
Pyongyang would consider any further pressure from the United 
States as a “declaration of war,” China began to put pressure on 
Pyongyang.30 On October 19, 2006, China sent a delegation led by 
Tang Jiaxuan, a senior Communist Party official at the State Council 
to conduct a high-level talk with Kim Jong-Il. The Chinese 
delegation was to stop North Korea from conducting a second 
nuclear test. China also tightened cargo inspection at the border city 
of Dandong and ordered four local banks to freeze money transfers 
to North Korea. It was rumored that China might cut its low-cost oil 
supplies in a cross-border pipeline which provided over 80% of 
North Korea’s energy.31 What China did was to keep the North 
Koreans and Americans at the negotiation table. The Chinese 
intervention actually prevented the further escalation of tensions on 
the Korean Peninsula and provided the United States with a 
face-saving opportunity to get out of the nuclear crisis. On October 
31, 2006, China announced the six-nation nuclear talks to be resumed 
soon after a meeting between envoys from the United States, North 
Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.3 
18 
Korea and China.32 It is worthy noting that very little attention had 
been paid to this announcement in the American media. 
 
The immediate reactions from the United States and China to 
North Korea’s nuclear test had significant geopolitical implications. 
The United States initially tested the level of tolerance of China, 
South Korea, Japan and Russia towards the American position on 
the use of force against the proven North Korean nuclear facilities. In 
reality, the United States has been trapped in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and it is not capable of launching a military action against North 
Korea. As David E. Sanger points out, “It is hard to remember a 
moment when the world’s sole superpower seemed less positioned 
to manage a fractured world. It is not only that American hard 
power is tied up in Baghdad and Kabul; Mr. Bush has acknowledged 
that soft power (i.e. the ability to lead because you are admired) is 
suffering too.”33 Because the United States could not deal with North 
Korea from a position of strength, it had to turn to China for help. 
Seen from this perspective, America’s power in Northeast Asia 
today can only be measured by its need to cooperate with China. 
 
The continuation of the six-nation nuclear talks in late 2006 
and early 2007 led to the North Korean agreement to disable its 
nuclear facilities. On October 3, 2007, North Korea announced in 
Beijing that it would disclose all its nuclear programs and facilities in 
exchange of 950,000 metric tons of fuel oil or its equivalent in 
economic aid. 34  Then, at the inter-Korean summit meeting in 
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Pyongyang on October 4, 2007, South Korea’s president, Roh 
Moo-Hyun and the North’s leader, Kim Jong-Il announced that both 
sides agreed to work toward signing a formal peace treaty to end the 
Korean War, which stopped after an armistice in 1953. This was a 
significant political concession by the North. The North had long 
asserted that South Korea would not be involved in any peace 
negotiation because only North Korea, China, and the United States 
signed the 1953 armistice.35 Evidently, China has not only mediated 
between the United States and North Korea throughout the 
six-nation nuclear talks but also facilitated the inter-Korean summit 
meeting in October 2007.  
 
The Chinese position on North Korea was to limit the 
possibilities of violent confrontation in Northeast Asia. Beijing 
opposed military acts against Pyongyang and handled the nuclear 
crisis by pressing the United States to negotiate directly with North 
Korea.36 Throughout the six-nation nuclear talks, China has clearly 
emerged as an equal of the United States.37 Ever since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, China has been keen to replace the longstanding 
Cold War structure with a new international order in Northeast Asia 
at the expense of the United States. The Sino-American relations are 
being shaped by the North Korean nuclear crisis and the Taiwan 
Question. In a trade off, China tacitly did not oppose the American 
policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, while it urged the United States to 
reduce its support for Taiwan’s military. Beijing has vowed to attack 
the island if its democratically elected government declares 
Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.3 
20 
independence. To gain China’s support in the North Korean nuclear 
crisis, the United States agreed to consider Beijing’s requests to 
postpone its support for Taiwan’s military modernization. 38 
Therefore, the Chinese active involvement in the North Korean 
nuclear crisis should be understood as a defense against any 
potential American military threats in Northeast Asia and a response 
to the Sino-American dispute over Taiwan. 
 
 
Balance of Power between China, India and Pakistan 
China’s relation with India is another problematic issue in its foreign 
policy. The Sino-Indian encounter has witnessed a change from 
strategic rivalry to economic collaboration. With the exception of the 
early 1950s, the Sino-Indian relations have been characterized by 
border conflict, regional rivalry, and strategic, military and economic 
competition. The Sino-Indian border conflicts resulted from the 
rejection by Beijing of the British-drawn McMahon Line of 1913-1914 
separating India and Tibet, the flight of Dalai Lama to India after the 
1959 Tibetan Uprising, as well as the dispute following the 1962 
border war in which China seized 38,000 square kilometers (14,670 
square miles) of Indian territory in Aksai Chin, and another 5,180 
square kilometers (2,000 square miles) of northern Kashmir that 
Pakistan ceded to Beijing under a 1963 pact.  
 
China has been restricting Indian power to the region of South 
Asia in order to avoid confronting a powerful India south of the 
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Himalayas. Beijing was extremely concerned when India permitted 
the creation of Dalai Lama’s exiled government in Dharamsala. In 
response, China decided to contain India by supporting Pakistan in 
the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the 
continuous Chinese arms transfers to Pakistan indicated the close 
links between Beijing and Islamabad.  
 
The Cold War conflict further complicated the Sino-Indian 
relations as shown in the Soviet alliance with India and the U.S. 
support for China since the 1970s. Despite the gradual development 
of Sino-Indian rapprochement after Indian Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988, China refused to sacrifice its 
strategic partnership with Pakistan. It is this “two-front threat” 
(Pakistan in the west and China in the north and northeast) that gave 
rise to Indian concern about China’s policy towards South Asia. 
Another security issue affecting the Sino-Indian relations is the rise 
of Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. To 
protect its lines of communication across the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans, China gradually expanded its naval activity in the region 
throughout the 1990s. China constructed new ports, maritime 
communication and overland transport routes in Pakistan and 
Burma, respectively. Underlying China’s agenda is the need to 
strengthen Pakistan in order to maintain the balance of power in 
South Asia.  
 
Indian policy makers view China as an interloper in South 
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Asia, an external power that has challenged India’s natural sphere of 
influence. Through its strategic alliance with Pakistan as well as its 
growing political and economic relations with weaker South Asian 
countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and the Himalayan 
kingdoms, Beijing has denied New Delhi’s claim to dominance in 
South Asia. With the end of the Cold War and the American military 
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States becomes an 
active factor in the balance of power between China, India and 
Pakistan. Because of the new quadrangular structure, the 
Indo-Pakistan-China interactions have been part of the tension 
between the United States and China over Taiwan and North 
Korea.39 For their part, Chinese leaders see India as an emerging 
regional power inclined to expand its military and economic power 
in South Asia. As a rising global power, China perceives South Asia 
as a legitimate area for expanding its diplomatic, economic and 
military influences in order to counter India and the United States.40 
In response to the perceived Chinese encirclement, India launched 
its own counter measures by pursuing security relations with 
China’s neighbors in the Pacific Ocean, especially Vietnam, Japan 
and Taiwan. This counter-encirclement by New Delhi was a direct 
response to China’s expansion of its security ties with Indian’s 
neighbors in South Asia. In the entangling relations between China 
and India, both sides have a series of defensive security concerns, 
and they continue to complete with each other in the wider Asian 
region.41  
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Despite their different perceptions over security issues like the 
strong Sino-Pakistan military ties and India’s Tibet policy, China and 
India are determined to cooperate and further expand their ties.42 
The high-level discussion about the border conflict between China 
and India in 2004 marks a new chapter in the Sino-Indian relations. 
President Bush’s visit to India in the spring of 2006 and his 
recognition of the Indian nuclear weapons program can be 
interpreted as his efforts to create a strong alliance between the 
United States and India on South Asian subcontinent to counter the 
rise of China and to gain India’s support for a potential war against 
Iran. But, on the other hand, with China’s refusal to impose sanction 
on Iran in the U.N. Security Council and its growing trade with 
Tehran via India and Pakistan, there seems to be an informal 
collaboration between China, Iran and India against the growing 
American military presence in the Asian heartland.43 If this is the 
case, Beijing will probably concede South Asia to New Delhi as 
India’s sphere of influence in order to maintain stable bilateral 
relations. In the face of a regional and global balance of power 
shifting more in China’s favor, India will have to come to terms with 
the reality of China’s emerging dominance in Asia and accept, 
however reluctantly, the status of a lesser power.44 
 
The respective economic accomplishments have enabled China 
and India to set aside mutual suspicion and to collaborate with each 
other. Bilateral trade between these two Asian giants doubled in 
recent years, rising up to around US$18 billion in 2005. The 
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Confederation of Indian Industry estimates that the bilateral trade 
will increase to US$30 billion by 2010. Both governments even 
opened a trade route at Nathula Pass in early 2006 in order to 
facilitate cross-border economic activities. The cooperation between 
these two Asian giants was institutionalized in a ten-point strategy 
to expand bilateral ties and promote civilian nuclear cooperation in 
a joint declaration issued by Hu Jintao and Manmohan Singh on 
November 21, 2006.45  
 
Furthermore, China and India are partners in an oil venture in 
Sudan, even though Europe and the United States have expressed 
concerns about the genocide in the Darfur region of western Sudan. 
China has outperformed India in gaining access to the rich deposits 
of iron ore, copper and oil in many African countries, and China’s 
bilateral trade with the continent was nearly US$40 billion in 2005. 
By comparison, Indian automakers are selling sport utility vehicles 
for the African market, promoting hair care products and 
constructing hotels, and the total amount of bilateral trade was about 
US$12 billion in 2005.46  The Chinese and Indian expansion into 
Africa reflects their growing concerns about energy security in the 
midst of high oil prices as well as a rush for oil, natural gas and other 
natural resources essential for industrial development. 
 
 
Africa as China’s New Frontier 
Of all the regions, the African continent has become a new frontier 
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for the Chinese expansion (Map 2). The search for new energy 
supplies is now the driving force of China’s African policy. As 
President Nicolas Sarkozy of France said, “China is transforming its 
insatiable quest for raw materials into a strategy of control, 
especially in Africa.”47 According to Jonathan Holslag, China sees 
Africa as an important resource supplier and a modest consumer. 
Therefore, the Chinese government has been pursuing a pragmatic 
mercantilist policy that combines diplomatic and economic activities 
since the 1990s.48 Although the Sino-African trade only makes up a 
small proportion of China’s overall foreign trade, its annual rate of 
growth is around 55% between 2001 and 2006, the fastest growing 
trade between China and any other continent. From 2001 to 2006, 
more than 10,000 African government officials and technical 
personnel have received training in China.49 These returnees served 
as the agents of China’s expansion into Africa.  
 
 
At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing on 
November 5, 2006, China signed bilateral trade deals with African 
countries worth US$1.9 billion and promised to provide US$3 billion 
in preferential loans, US$2 billion in export credits and US$5 billion 
to encourage Chinese investment in Africa. These agreements are 
part of China’s consistent efforts to consolidate its ties with Africa, to 
bid for oil deals and to seek new markets for its products.50 The 
examples of Angola and Sudan are illustrative.  
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Angola, as sub-Saharan Africa’s second largest oil producer, is 
central to China’s energy diplomacy in the continent. In 2004, 
bilateral trade accounted for US$4.9 billion, increasing more than 
113% from 2003. The state-owned China Petrochemical Corporation 
is a major investor in Sonangol, the Angolan state oil corporation.51 
In May 2006, Angola surpassed Saudi Arabia as China’s largest 
crude oil supplier and provided 15% of China’s total oil import. In 
2007, Chinese enterprises were the largest foreign investors in 
Angola. The country has now become China’s second largest trading 
partner in Africa.52  
 
Equally important to the Chinese energy diplomacy in Africa 
is Sudan, where China is now the largest investor with total stakes 
worth US$4 billion. The China National Petroleum Corporation now 
owns the biggest share (40%) of Sudan’s largest oil enterprise, the 
Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company. This Sino-Sudanese oil 
operation built the 930-mile pipeline to the Red Sea and an oil 
refinery near Khartoum. China has also invested US$ 2 billion in the 
Merowe hydropower dam project. When the dam opens in 2008, the 
Merowe will meet Sudan’s demand for electricity and allow the 
country to sell the excess to other African neighbors. Meanwhile, the 
Sudanese government has been relying on China for the supply of 
weapons and military tracks throughout the civil war. China is 
filling the power vacuum left by the West in Sudan and gaining 
control over the country’s oil and other natural resources. As China  
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seeks to protect its business interests, it has strongly opposed the 
United Nations’ attempt to interfere into the Darfur conflict.53 Hu 
Jintao’s trip to Sudan in February 2007 further confirms the growing 
importance of economic and diplomatic relations between the two 
countries.54 This development indicates that Africa is becoming a top 
priority in Chinese foreign policy.  
 
There have also been closer military and diplomatic relations 
between China and many African countries at the expense of the 
American influence. Chinese military aid and arms sales to Africa 
are on the rise. In 2001, China sold Sudan twelve F-7 Shenyang 
fighter jets (the Chinese equivalent of the Russian MiG-12) and 
Zimbabwe twelve FC-1 multipurpose fighters as well as numerous 
lighter arms to Angola, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and others.55 Most of 
the Chinese firms investing in Africa are state-owned enterprises 
and enjoy strong government support. They are often willing to 
make less tangible long-term business decisions rather than seeking 
immediate profits.      
 
 
The Growth of Chinese Influence in Latin America  
In a fashion akin to Africa, Latin America has gradually become an 
attractive destination for Chinese investors (Map 2). The 
Chinese-Latin American business and political connections have 
become a matter of concern to policy makers in the United States.56 
China has begun to operate on the peripheries of the United States. 
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The most controversial issue was the clash of the Chinese and 
American interests over the Panama Canal. In 1999, the Panama 
government issued an international tender to negotiate a 25-year 
contract for managing the container terminals at the Atlantic and 
Pacific outlets of the Canal. Panama signed a contract with the 
Panama Ports Company, a subsidiary of the Hong Kong-based 
Hutchinson Whampoa Ltd., which is one of the Fortune 500 
companies and owned by Li Ka-Shing, the richest tycoon in Asia and 
the ninth richest man on the world’s billionaires in 2007. Besides the 
Hutchinson’s track record of handling most of Hong Kong’s 
container traffic, Beijing’s support was a key to the implementation 
of the contract. Li Ka-Shing is widely known to have strong personal 
connection with the top political leaders in Beijing, and he is said to 
be willing to use his business influence to advance the strategic and 
political interests of the Chinese Government.57 At that time, the 
Republicans at the Congress feared that Beijing could take over the 
Canal’s security, but they failed to block the signing of the contract 
between the Hutchinson and the Panama government.58 
 
The rivalry over the control of the Panama Canal reveals the 
broader patterns of economic, political and strategic competitions 
between Beijing and Washington. As the United States considers 
Latin America to be its sphere of influence, some government 
officials in Washington are worried that many Latin American 
countries will replace the United States with China as their primary 
patron. 59  From 1993 to 2003, the Chinese-Latin American trade 
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increased 600%.60 In 2004, the total amount of bilateral trade between 
China and Latin America was $40 billion. This figure overtook 
Japan’s trade with Latin America. China has become a new market 
for Chilean copper, Argentine and Brazilian soybeans, and the 
region’s ores and gas resources. Geographically the Chinese trade 
has always been heavily concentrated in Mexico, Brazil, Chile and 
Argentina which makes up 75% of its total trade in the region. In 
recent years, China and Brazil developed joint programs in space 
and aviation industries. China also gained access to the exploration 
of Bolivia’s natural gas reserves as well as the development of oil 
fields in Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru. Much of the Chinese 
investment in Latin America focuses on the construction of 
infrastructure so that the region can export its goods more efficiently 
to China.61 In November 2004, China pledged to invest more than 
US$19 billion in the Argentine railway system and other 
construction projects. China is also committed to constructing a 
cross-national highway from Sao Paolo in Brazil to Lima in Peru so 
that products from other countries can be easily transported to 
Peru’s harbors along the Pacific coast and from there to be shipped 
to China.62 The growth of the trans-Pacific maritime trade has an 
important impact in re-orientating Latin America towards China. 
 
Apart from the bilateral trade, there has been cooperation 
among the Chinese and Latin American military. China is reported 
to have been operating two intelligence stations out of Cuba since 
1999, monitoring computer data traffic and telephone traffic within 
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the United States, respectively. In 2001, China negotiated with 
Russia for the use of a Soviet-built military base on the outskirts of 
Havana for gathering intelligence on the United States.63 China has 
taken advantage of the vacuum created by Washington’s decision to 
cut military aid to several Latin American countries. Many senior 
Latin American military officers who used to come to the United 
States for training are now going to Beijing. The United States is 
losing contact with the future generation of the Latin American 
officers to China.  
 
 
Conclusion 
There has been a significant shift in the Chinese foreign policy 
towards the Third World since September 11, 2001. During the 
Maoist and the Dengist era, China was mainly responding to the 
international pressures from the United States and the Soviet Union 
rather than dealing with the Third World countries per se. But the 
failure of the American military policies in Iraq and Afghanistan 
created many vacuums throughout the world and completely 
changed China’s diplomatic priorities. The United States is now 
facing a serious setback in the Second Iraqi War and losing the 
diplomatic battle against Iran. As Iraq disintegrates into civil war 
with the United States caught in the middle, it will be extremely 
difficult for the American military to establish law and order in a 
land with different types of Islamic communities as well as a large 
Assyrian and Syrian Orthodox Christian population, together with 
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Chaldean Catholics and Jews.64 Neither will it be possible for the 
United States to impose the American form of democracy and free 
market economy in this war-torn country.65 Given the proliferation 
of Iraqi resistance forces and the growth of anti-Americanism across 
the Middle East, the withdrawal of the U.S. army is only a matter of 
time. As the United States is troubled by the Second Iraqi War and 
becomes increasingly isolated around the world, China has 
exploited the War on Terror to its political advantages.66  
 
Furthermore, the regional and global balance of power is 
shifting more and more in China’s favor. Beijing seeks to create a 
new system of strategic alliance and to enhance its influence around 
the world. Since 2001, it has pursued an active policy of engaging 
many Third World countries in order to undermine the 
U.S.-dominated international order. This development corresponds 
to the current Chinese government’s rhetoric about the peaceful rise 
of China, meaning that a powerful China will not occupy territories 
and seek military bases as the Western imperialists had done in the 
past.67  
 
Strategically speaking, China’s active engagement with many 
countries in Central Asia, Latin America, South Asia and Africa 
reminds us of the classic Maoist strategy of guerrilla warfare, 
“encircling the city from the countryside,” which in this case is to use 
the Third World countries to challenge the United States in global 
politics. The question for many developing and underdeveloped 
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countries now is whether to side with a declining global American 
empire or to ally with the rising Middle Kingdom. Evidently many 
ruling elites from the Third World are aligning with China for 
political and economic gains and distancing themselves from the 
United States. If the Chinese economic and military power continues 
to expand dramatically in the next few decades, thisgrowth will soon 
propel China towards its strategic goals of achieving dominance in 
Asia and becoming a global power of the twentieth-first century.   
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